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LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND
THE ROAD FORWARD
Stanislaw Gomulka*
My primary purpose is to comment on the experiences so far by the
formerly communist countries in transforming their economies with a view
to proposing lessons for policy-making.  Although my familiarity is
greatest with the Polish experience I shall make use of the empirical
evidence, both economic and political, from the whole area of Central and
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FSU), particularly Russia.
I begin with a few general observations about the choice of reform
strategy.  This I follow with a discussion of the output collapse and the
conduct of macroeconomic policies.  The Ten Commandments of Mr
Klaus provide me with a further opportunity to comment on policies.
Finally, I shall take a closer look at Russia and comment briefly on
developments in Poland.
1.  Reform Strategy
The change of economic system now under way in Central and
Eastern Europe and the FSU requires, of course, major structural shifts in
terms of institutions, ownership, modes of interpersonal behaviour,
attitudes to work and laws.  Some institutions have to be cut in size or
closed down, others expanded or created.  These institutional changes are
superimposed on large changes in the pattern of prices and foreign trade
relations, both of which imply major shifts in the required composition of
output.  In particular, exports to the former Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) area and the shares of industry in GDP have to fall and
did fall dramatically.  On the other hand, the share of trade and financial
services should increase and are increasing sharply.
In terms of institutions, skills, prices and products, there is therefore
a large distance between the initial point where a post-communist economy
finds itself just before the reforms and the end point of its intended
transition.  Reform strategy is about the speed and sequence of reforms to
effect the transition.
2A policy designer, in proposing a broad reform strategy and specific
policies, has also to take into account particular economic circumstances
as well as political constraints.  These circumstances relate above all to the
sizes of internal and external disequilibria and the possible extent of
external assistance.
The strategy has therefore five major components: micro-
liberalisation, macro-stabilisation, structural changes, safety nets and
external assistance.  Of these the first three are crucial components of any
reform package.  External assistance is typically small and of limited
impact even though it may be useful for political reasons to exaggerate its
significance by both donors and recipients.
The inherited circumstances fall into two categories, common and
country-specific.  The common part dominates and ensures that the reform
policies and transition paths exhibit some basic similarities among
countries.  Nevertheless, the variation in country-specific circumstances is
substantial enough to have a major impact on the choice of overall reform
strategy as well as specific policies.
The similarities are possibly greatest with respect to rapid micro-
liberalisation and some important structural changes, notably rapid
reorientation of foreign trade and privatisation.  Somewhat unexpectedly,
the greatest differences have emerged in the area of macroeconomic policy.
Three broad reform strategies may be distinguished: the so called
shock therapy, managed shock and gradual.  The true shock therapy was
applied only in East Germany where Western prices were imposed from
one day to the next.  Although subsidies remained in place, the instant
monetary union meant that local producers were offered no protection
against West German products.  Moreover, real wages for political reasons
were increased sharply.  The outcome is well known: drastic collapse of
industrial output, massive unemployment and external assistance of some
$100 billion per year.  Although this strategy offers the potential for a fast
reallocation of resources, it is far too costly in the short and medium term
to be of interest to any other post-communist country.  At the other end of
the spectrum is the truly gradual strategy.  This has been pursued
successfully only by China since the late 1970s.  The strategy had been
tried also in Central Europe, especially in Hungary and Poland, but with
insufficient vigour and poor results.  In conditions of severe economic and
3political crisis, virtually the only choice open for the FSU and Central
Europe was therefore a form of managed shock.  A strong form of it was
adopted by Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Czecho-Slovakia and a more
gradual variant in most other transition economies, particularly Russia.
2.  The Output Collapse Has Been Inevitable
Unusually large output declines during the initial phase of transition
are probably the socially gravest and the most politically dangerous
economic phenomenon.  The critics of radical reforms have tended to
associate these declines with, in their view, excessively restrictive
macroeconomic policies.  However, it is now clear and this is possibly the
key lesson from the cumulative experience of transition countries during
the last four years, that the output declines have little to do with the
conduct of macroeconomic policy.  It would appear that, given the large
weight and commonality of inherited economic problems (and the fast
speed with which the transition has taken place), the recessions inevitably
have to be deep and fairly long everywhere.
The range of measured GDP falls is nevertheless quite wide, from
about 17% in Poland to about 50% in parts of Central Europe and the
FSU.  The recession appears to be deeper whenever; the initial price
distortions are larger, the price liberalisation is faster, the private sector is
smaller, the defence sector is larger and the intra-CMEA trade accounts for
a larger proportion of GDP.  Price liberalization contributes to recession
by virtue of the fact that it leads to prices increasing much faster than
wages and other income.  This results in large falls of real purchasing
power.  The falls, however, are necessary in order to eliminate the forced
buying of goods (forced substitution) so that the market mechanism can
begin to function.  Price liberalization results also in changed relative
prices which require large changes in the entire product composition of the
supply side.  Owing to the presence of various rigidities, substantial
resources become permanently useless or idle until redeployed and/or
improved to produce the goods which, under new prices and new trade
links, are in demand and profitable.
The immediate implication of this interpretation of output falls is
that post-reform sustainable supplies should form J-curve patterns. The
further implication is that macroeconomic policies of the authorities must
4not attempt to regain the earlier levels of real aggregate demand.  That
demand must be allowed to fall to the level of much reduced aggregate
supply.  In other words, the essentially structural causes of these recessions
imply that they cannot be reversed in a Keynesian way through an
expansion of nominal aggregate demand.  By far the dominant, if not the
only, effects of any such expansion are higher prices and/or higher net
imports.
The experience also shows that the needed supply-side adjustments
take place much faster in the private sector than in the state sector.
Consequently, the size of the private sector at the start of the transition
appears to be the single most important factor influencing the size of initial
output fall and the speed of subsequent recovery.
3.  Money Has Been the Key Nominal Anchor
In most countries of Central and Eastern Europe it was assumed that
stabilization of the liberalised prices must be based on the standard
International Monetary Fund (IMF) approach with an important role for
nominal anchors assigned to a tough incomes policy and a fixed exchange
rate, in addition to a restrictive monetary policy.  However, the money
supply has emerged to be by far the dominant nominal anchor with the
exchange rate and the incomes policy playing no role or only supportive
roles.  With respect to the exchange rate there were good reasons, such as
low levels of international reserves and poor credibility of macroeconomic
policies, why large up-front devaluations were necessary.  But the
immediate consequence of such devaluations was that large gaps opened
up between domestic and world prices for tradables, so that, initially, world
prices offered little discipline on domestic prices.  The other potential
anchor, an incomes policy, was intended to help to achieve a given inflation
rate with a less restrictive monetary policy and hence a possibly smaller
recession.  However, given the large risks and uncertainties, it has proved
difficult to coordinate the anchor role of the two policies, incomes and
monetary.  In Poland in 1990 and Czecho-Slovakia in 1991, for instance,
monetary policies were initially so restrictive that incomes policies were
not binding in most enterprises.  In the FSU the authorities took the view
that a really restrictive incomes policy could not be implemented for
political reasons.  Moreover, in Russia the politically dependent Central
5Bank became excessively concerned with the level of economic activity,
typically the domain of governments.  A wage-price inflationary spiral was
the consequence.
In the pursuit of a proper monetary policy, the experience has been
that credit limits can be used successfully by the Central Bank, especially
in the initial few years of the transition.  Consequently, the real interest
rates need not be positive to begin with but they should not be strongly
negative as they have been in most of the FSU.  However, the rates may
have to be strongly positive in the intermediate stage of transition when
credit limits are lifted and the real exchange rate has had time to appreciate.
In that stage the interest rate becomes the key policy instrument to protect
international reserves, induce savings and restrain wage inflation.
4.  The Exchange Rate Policy
A large upfront devaluation at a unified rate has proved to be an
effective policy during the vital initial phase to protect domestic producers
and to replenish international reserves.  Consequently, internal
convertibility was achieved in many countries and has been successfully
maintained.  However, it is important not to overburden the exchange rate
with its role as a nominal anchor in the later stages of transition.  The
Polish experience suggests that the policy of a pre-announced crawling peg
is a very good follow-up, provided the switch to it from the fixed rate
regime is not unduly delayed.
5.  The Public Finance Crisis and the Fiscal Policy
In all transition countries, with the notable exception of Hungary,
budget deficits are financed almost wholly by bank credit.  Moreover, the
velocity of money circulation tends to be high, especially in those countries
which are experiencing or have recently experienced a hyperinflation.  The
combination of the two features is that budget deficits are highly
inflationary.  An independent role for Central Banks and their monetary
policies is fairly limited.  Yet all transition countries, with the notable
exception so far of the Czech Republic, appear to suffer from a crisis of
public finance.  Therefore the political will and administrative ability to
control a budget deficit effectively determines the success or failure of a
stabilisation programme.   Some countries, notably Hungary and Poland,
6have already accumulated a large public debt.  In these countries the rapidly
rising cost of servicing the debt and above all the high and rising social
transfers are the two categories of public expenditures which together are
emerging as posing the greatest threat to macroeconomic stability.
6. Mr Klaus' Ten Commandments
In his address to the Group of Thirty at its Spring 1993 Plenary
meeting in Vienna, Mr Klaus, the present Prime Minister of the Czech
Republic, summarised his experiences as a major reformer in the form of
Ten Commandments for what he calls profound, fundamental, structural
reforms.  Let me remind you of these Commandments and comment on
them.  They are as follows:
(i) Reforms in post-communist countries are the outcome of a
complex social and political process and therefore cannot be
pre-planned or socially-engineered by any one person or centre.
(ii) The role of foreign aid is marginal. 
(iii) An economic shock, meaning a large fall of output, is
inevitable.
(iv) Dramatic actions are required to impose a restrictive
macroeconomic policy, liberalise prices and foreign trade, and
establish a process for privatisation.
(v) Restrictive macroeconomic policy must be sustained.
(vi) The price shock resulting from price liberalisation must be
vigorously defended and survived.
(vii) Economic restructuring requires comprehensive privatisation.
(viii) Transformation costs must be widely shared.
7(ix) Successful transformation requires opening foreign markets to
goods and the free flow of people and ideas.
(x) Successful transformation requires successful politicians.
I take these propositions in the spirit in which, I believe, they were
proposed, as important messages but not as universal laws of nature.  With
this proviso, I have no particular problems in endorsing them.  My
comments are therefore intended only to offer some modifications to some
of these propositions.
The reforms are not just the outcome of a political process as the
First Commandment asserts.  After all, the purpose of transition is not to
invent something new but imitate the well-known solutions of market-
based capitalist economies of the West European type.  Reformers do have
specific reform blueprints which they then attempt to implement through
the political process.  These are useful to have even if the timetable, the
sequencing and the methods of their implementation may change.  Given
the huge cost of standing still or going back, the ultimate result is still
unlikely to be much different from the original blueprint.
With respect to foreign aid, I have already suggested its marginal size
and role for most countries.   The reason is self-evident.  Using purchasing
power parities, per capita GDP in the FSU and Central Europe was just
before the reforms, some $5000.  Therefore, the total GDP of all the
transition countries was about 2000 billion US dollars.  The investment
needed to restructure economies of that size sufficiently, so that at the least
the pre-reform level of GDP is regained, is probably of the same order of
magnitude; that is, some $2000 billion.  The resources of the IMF and the
World Bank are clearly too small by comparison and can in any case be
provided only on a commercial basis and therefore subject to conditions
which economies in transition cannot easily meet.  Having said that, there
are a few small countries in which foreign aid, especially in the form of
grants and debt reductions, can be said to have been vital.
I have already argued in favour of Commandments Three to Seven
which form the core of any determined reform effort.  Short-term costs
arising from conducting a restrictive macroeconomic policy appear small,
while medium and long-term gains are clearly large.  The experience of
8some countries, notably Russia, suggests that a successful stabilization
policy is not a necessary precondition for the implementation of the other
truly transformation-related reforms, particularly privatization and
liberalization of prices and foreign trade.  However, once policy and
attention moves from transformation to recovery and sustainable growth,
macroeconomic stabilization becomes essential.
A similar caveat can be made with respect to Mr Klaus's
Commandment Seven, concerning the need for rapid privatisation.  In
Poland the state-driven privatisation has been slow.  Yet, a rapid
autonomous growth of the private sector, which is the organic privatisation
favoured by Professor Kornai, has ensured that the sector accounted, in
1993, for about 60% of total employment and about 50% of GDP.  So
again, rapid privatisation of the existing state sector is helpful but may not
be as necessary as Mr Klaus thinks.
The Tenth Commandment is also an exaggeration.  Successful
politicians are helpful but not necessary for a successful transformation.
Reform, of course, must be legitimized through a democratic political
process.  This is vital.  But the socially costly phase of transition comes at
a time when democratic institutions are in their infancy.  Consequently
there are typically too many small parties with ill-defined policies, the
division of power between the main central institutions is often unclear and
many politicians lack experience of efficient communication with the
electorate.  Such circumstances often produce confusion and political
instability which of course hinder the process of economic reform and pose
a continual threat to democratic politics.  The result of this so far has been
frequent changes of government and in many cases, legislative near-
paralysis.  In this respect the Czech Republic is an exception to the rule.
However, the experience has also been that frequent changes of
government provide an opportunity to employ the political capital of a
large pool of politicians which is in the interest of the transformation
during the socially costly phases of reform.
7.  A Closer Look At Russia
There has been much confusion about what kind of strategy Russia
has followed and much discussion about policies which the country should
follow - less shock and more therapy or more shock and more therapy.  The
9questions to be answered are these; What view should we have about the
strategy underlining Russian reforms so far?  Was it a shock therapy at all?
Was it excessively gradual?  With respect to macroeconomics policies,
why have they been so inflationary?  Were they completely irrational?
What are we to expect now, following the results of recent parliamentary
elections and the departure of Yegor Gaidar from the Russian cabinet?
Concerning the last two years, our evaluation of reforms should be
clear - Russia in its own chaotic manner has followed a managed shock
therapy.  After all, the three main components of that strategy have been
implemented; (1) fast liberalisation of most prices, including the exchange
rate, permitting the replacement of central planning by market co-
ordination; (2) considerable foreign trade liberalisation, leading to large
shifts in the geographical and product composition of trade; and (3) a large
progress in privatisation and other structural changes.  Russia's reforms
have been extremely gradual only with respect to inflation.  But low
inflation is neither necessary nor sufficient to effect systemic
transformation.  There remains also the historical fact that low inflation
was observed in Russia under Stalin and Brezhnev and hyperinflations were
experienced by many market economies.  The three components I
mentioned above, and they alone, are the core of the transformation.
However, Russia's macroeconomic policies have clearly been
excessively inflationary.  The reasons are not completely transparent.  We
know that Russia's inflation crisis has been almost purely a monetary
phenomenon (Easterly and da Cunha, 1993), driven by large budget deficits
and subsidised credits to economic units.  My experience is that when
output is falling fast all over the place, as a result of fast systemic
transformation, there is a sense of terror in the corridors of power.  The
danger of a chain reaction looms large, whereby some bankruptcies will
lead abruptly to a sequence of other bankruptcies and ultimately to a nearly
total disintegration of the economy.  Hence the apparent need is felt to
retain subsidies, at least in the most politically or socially sensitive sectors,
such as defence and agriculture.  However, in Russia these subsidies have
been vastly excessive, at some 15% of GDP - about the same as before the
start of transition.  It is also interesting that Russia's assistance to the other
republics of the FSU has been very high, probably much greater than the
combined Western assistance to these countries.  The new Russian state has
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thus been intent on maintaining its old strategic priorities: imperial
influence, selected industrial capacities and a strong military.  The
priorities are pursued with perhaps less vigour now than in the communist
past but still at a considerable expense in terms of the progress of reform
and the living standards of Russian people.  What is clear and alarming, is
that the policy is not just that of the Russian Central Bank or some
ministers, but also, indeed above all, of the country's President and
Parliament.
Russia has arrived at the start of 1994, at a crossroad similar to that
which Poland reached two years ago following Poland's first free
parliamentary elections and the departure of Leszek Balcerowicz.  At that
time the Olszewski government was strongly critical of earlier policies and
initially intended to reflate the economy.  However, key economic
ministers (and myself as their macroeconomics adviser) managed to
persuade the government,  even without the help of the IMF, that the scope
for safe anti-recessionary policies was extremely limited and more or less
sensible policies were adopted.
The chance of Russia adopting a different course leading to even
more inflation, widespread price controls and more subsidies is now,
unfortunately, uncomfortably high.  The inflation tax paid by households
was, in 1992, estimated as 12% of GDP (Easterly and da Cunha, 1993).
The dollarization of savings and an increase of real interest rates are
leading to a decline of the base for the inflationary tax and consequently an
increase in the velocity of money circulation.  Without the political strong
will to confront the situation there is now a clear danger of a sharp increase
of inflation and a renewed large capital flight.  
On the positive side, Russia is already close to the end of the first
phase of transition; one of liberalisation, demolition and construction.  The
cumulative fall of measured GDP during 1991-93 has been close to 40%.
In the course of 1994 the country should enter the consolidation phase, in
which the level of activity is stable and unemployment low but rising.  The
balance of trade has already improved vastly and the rapid privatisation
process, if continued, should lead soon to the appearance of first islands of
recovery and growth.  A new decree, dated 27 October 1993, legalising the
purchase and sale of land, should speed up the privatisation of agriculture.
The electoral success of Mr Zhirinovsky and his far-right nationalist party
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is potentially an extreme danger in the medium term, especially in terms of
foreign policy but may induce cooperation among reformers and alarm the
nation's political centre.
8.  The Special Case of Poland
Poland is the country with the lowest transition-related fall in
industrial output and GDP in Central and Eastern Europe.  It has also been
the first transition country to experience, in the years 1992-93, a significant
economic recovery.  On the demand side, the recovery has been very much
consumption-led.  Following a sharp fall, by about 15% in 1990, private
consumption has increased in the three years 1991-93 by about 20%.  On
the supply side, the driving force has been the private sector.  This sector
apparently suffered no recession even in the first year of transition and has
been expanding very fast during the last three years.  However, even Poland
will have great difficulties in sustaining growth at a rate commensurate
with a low and constant rate of unemployment.  The two major Polish
problems are likely to be typical for most transition economies: low
savings and high public expenditures, requiring high taxation and
considerable public dis-saving.  The concern to protect living standards has
so far dominated the attention of both households and the authorities.
Consequently, the rate of inflation and the rate of interest are still high and
the rate of investment is low.  There is therefore the danger that the rate of
unemployment - at about 16%, very high already - will continue to
increase.
Despite these problems, Poland looks, and is at the start of 1994, an
island of success in an ocean of misery and distress.  While the worst also
seems to be over for a few other transition countries, notably the Czech
Republic and possibly Hungary, most are likely to remain in a state of
acute crisis for some time yet.
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ENDNOTE
* The author has been Economic Adviser to Poland's successive
Finance Ministers since September 1989 supported financially
by the British Government's Know-How Fund.  As a member
of the Balcerowicz Group he advised the Polish Government
on the elaboration and implementation of the 1990-91 reform.
In 1990-91 he was a member of the Polish delegation
negotiating the debt reduction with the Paris and London
Clubs.  In the period 1989-93 he participated in all
negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank concerning
macroeconomic and other policies for Poland.  He also advised
the Russian Government, in the second half of 1991, on the
liberalization and stabilization policies for 1992.  At the
London School of Economics he is Reader in Economics in the
Department of Economics and Director of the CEP's
Programme on Post-Communist Reform.
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